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On Parents Involved and the Problematic
Praise of Justice Clarence Thomas
by RONALD TURNER*

Introduction
In The Seattle and Louisville School Cases: There is No Other
Way,' a recent comment on the United States Supreme Court's
decision in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School
District No. 1,2 Judge J. Harvie Wilkinson III focuses, among other
things, on Justice Clarence Thomas's concurrence in that case.
Describing, endorsing, and indeed celebrating Thomas's "passion and
eloquence" and courage,3 Judge Wilkinson argues that the "Thomas
concurrence is a culmination of a remarkable string of
pronouncements on race and education by the Court's sole African
American Justice. 4
In this brief essay, I argue that Judge Wilkinson's praise of
Justice Thomas is problematic in two respects. First, in applauding
Justice Thomas for the "intensely personal statements"5 found in the
Justice's judicial opinions and for speaking "from the depths of the

* Alumnae Law Center Professor of Law, University of Houston Law Center;
rturner@central.uh.edu. J.D. University of Pennsylvania Law School; B.A. Wilberforce
University. The author is thankful for the research support provided by the Alumnae Law
Center donors and the University of Houston Law Foundation. This essay is dedicated to
the memory of Professor John Calmore.
1. J. Harvie Wilkinson III, The Seattle and Louisville School Cases: There is No
Other Way, 121 HARV. L. REV. 158 (2007).
2. Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007)
(holding that race-conscious student assignment plans voluntarily adopted by the Seattle,
Washington and Jefferson County, Kentucky school boards violated the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
3. Wilkinson, supra note 1, at 164, 167.
4. Id. at 164.
5. Id.
[2251
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experience, ' ' 6

Wilkinson praises
American and African American
Thomas for doing that which the Justice decries: the commission of an
act of nonoriginalist and discretionary judging grounded in and
reflecting the Justice's race and ideology

Second, Wilkinson

uncritically embraces Thomas's invocation of Frederick Douglass
(whose "portrait hangs in Thomas's chambers") 8 as iconic support for
the view that "the Constitution does not permit 'measures to keep the
races together' any more than it allowed measures to keep the races
apart."9

As discussed below,' ° this unquestioning acceptance of

Thomas's reliance on the purported views of Douglass is a notable
illustration of the perils of celebratory commentary.
I. Justice Thomas on Judging
How should judges decide cases?" In an April 1996 speech
Justice Thomas expressed his concern that "the public, and often
those in the legal profession and academia, view judges as enjoying12
great latitude within which to express their personal preferences.'
Thomas lamented what he termed the "popular misconception" that

"[p]olitics and personal views rather than law, are seen as motivating
forces behind Supreme Court decisions."'' 3 Judges are "impartial

referees" and "impartiality is the very essence of judging and of being
a judge."' 4 Thomas stated:

6. Id. at 169.
7. See infra notes 15-18, and accompanying text.
8. KEVIN MERIDA & MICHAEL A. FLETCHER, SUPREME DISCOMFORT: THE
DIVIDED SOUL OF CLARENCE THOMAS 278 (2007).
9. Wilkinson, supra note 1, at 167 (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting Parents
Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 780-81 (2007)).
10. See infra notes 80-83, and accompanying text.
11. See ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, WHAT SHOULD LEGAL ANALYSIS
BECOME? 107 (1996) ("The conversation-stopping question '[h]ow should judges decide
cases?' has remained the central question in the theory of law.").
12. Clarence Thomas, Judging, 45 U. KAN. L. REV. 1, 2 (1996).
13. Id.
14. Id. at 4; see also Martha Minow, Stripped Down Like a Runner or Enriched by
Experience: Bias and Impartiality of Judges and Jurors, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1201,
1202 (1992) (quoting Supreme Court nominee Thomas' testimony that "as a judge, '[y]ou
want to be stripped down like a runner,' and 'shed the baggage of ideology."'). A sports
umpire analogy was made by then-Judge John G. Roberts, Jr., in his Supreme Court
confirmation hearing. Roberts told the Senate Judiciary Committee that "[j]udges are like
umpires. Umpires don't make rules; they apply them. And nobody ever went to a
ballgame to see the umpire." Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G.
Roberts, Jr., to be Chief Justice of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the
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A judge does not look to his or her sex or racial, social, or
religious background when deciding a case. It is exactly these
factors that a judge must push to one side in order to render a
fair, reasoned judgment on the meaning of the law. In order to
be a judge, a person must attempt to exorcise himself or herself
of the passions, thoughts and emotions that fill any frail human
being. He must become almost pure, in the way that fire
purifies metal, before he can decide a case. Otherwise, he is not
a judge, but a legislator, for whom it is entirely appropriate to
consider personal and group interests.' 5
16
Rejecting the views of "legal realists" and "critical theorists
who, in his characterization, believe that "law was merely personal
discretion," 7 Thomas argued that if "judging is simply the exercise of
personal discretion by a judge, then cases, legal rules, and, indeed, the
law itself, is merely the product of the person and, more importantly,
the social structure and class that produced him or her."' 8
When it comes to interpreting and applying the Constitution-"a
difficult challenge because the Constitution itself is written in broad
and sometimes ambiguous terms"' 9-Thomas has made clear that
"judges should seek the original understanding of the provision's text,
if that text's meaning is not readily apparent., 20 Thomas believes

Judiciary, 109th Cong. 55 (2005). Judge Richard Posner, criticizing Roberts's umpireal
analogy, contends that "[n]either [Roberts] nor any other knowledgeable person actually
believed or believes that the rules that judges in our system apply, particularly appellate
judges and most particularly the Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court, are given to them the
way the rules of baseball are given to umpires." RICHARD A. POSNER, How JUDGES
THINK 78 (2008).

15. Thomas, supra note 12, at 4.
16. See generally LAURA KALMAN, THE STRANGE CAREER OF LEGAL LIBERALISM

13-22,82-87,177-79 (1996) (discussing legal realism, critical legal studies, and critical race theory).
17. Thomas, supra note 12, at 6.
18. Id. at 3; see also John 0. Calmore, Close Encounters of the Racial Kind:
Pedagogical Reflections and Seminar Conversations, 31 U.S.F. L. REV. 903, 910 (1997)

(commenting on this argument by Justice Thomas, John Calmore remarked, "While I am
unaware of any claim within Critical Race Theory that 'judging is simply the exercise of
personal discretion by a judge,' it is claimed that neither judging nor the law is free from
the subordinating features Justice Thomas cites." (quoting Thomas, supra note 12, at 3)).
19. Thomas, supra note 12, at 5.
20. Id. at 6; see also id. at 7 ("[T]he Constitution means not what the Court says it
means, but what the delegates of the Philadelphia and state ratifying conventions
understood it to mean. . . . We as a nation adopted a written Constitution precisely
because it has a fixed meaning that does not change.").
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originalism 2' promotes judicial impartiality by reducing a judge's
resort to discretion-based decisionmaking.22 Justice Thomas has
employed originalist methodology in his opinions in cases involving
the Commerce Clause,2z the First Amendment,24 the Takings Clause,'
and the Fourteenth Amendment's Privileges or Immunities Clause.26
Interestingly, no attempt to discern the original understanding or
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause 7 is
found in Thomas's concurring opinion in ParentsInvolved.2
II. Parents Involved: Justice Thomas, Concurring
In ParentsInvolved, the Supreme Court, in a 5-4 vote, held that
voluntary racial integration and pupil assignment plans adopted by
school boards in Seattle, Washington, and Jefferson County,
Kentucky, violated the Equal Protection Clause.29 Grounding his
analysis in what he described as the "heritage" of the Court's seminal

21. See generally JONATHAN O'NEILL, ORIGINALISM IN AMERICAN LAW AND
POLITICS: A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY (2005); ORIGINALISM: A QUARTER-CENTURY

OF DEBATE (Steven G. Calabresi ed., 2007). For a recent, prominent, and much discussed
exemplar of the Court's originalist approach in interpreting and applying the Second
Amendment, see Districtof Columbia v. Heller, 128 S.Ct. 2783 (2008).
22. See Thomas, supra note 12, at 6.
23. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 584 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring)
("[W]e ought to temper our Commerce Clause jurisprudence in a manner that ... is more
faithful to the original understanding of that Clause.").
24. See, e.g., Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 410-11 (2007) (Thomas, J., concurring)
("[T]he history of public education suggests that the First Amendment, as originally
understood, does not protect student speech in schools."); Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S.
677, 693 (2005) (Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing that the Court should return to and
apply the original meaning of the Establishment Clause).
25. See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 506 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(arguing that the Court's takings decisions "have strayed from the [Public Use] Clause's
original meaning" and should be reconsidered).
26. See Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 521, 522 (1989) (Thomas, J., dissenting)
("look[ing] to history to ascertain the original meaning of the Clause").
27. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 4 ("No State shall ... deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.").
28. See James E. Ryan, The Supreme Court and Voluntary Integration, 121 HARV. L.
REV. 131, 150 (2007) ("Whatever else one might say about the Court's opinion, it is not
originalist. Nor does Justice Thomas's concurring opinion rely, more than fleetingly and
vaguely, on originalism.").
29. For discussions and examinations of the Court's decision, see Goodwin Liu,
'History Will Be Heard': An Appraisal of the Seattle/Louisville Decision, 2 HARV. L. &
POL'Y REV. 53 (2008); Ryan, supra note 28; Ronald Turner, The Voluntary School
IntegrationCases and the Contextual Equal Protection Clause,51 HOW. L.J. 251 (2008).
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30 Chief Justice
and canonical decision in Brown v. Board of Education,
John G. Roberts Jr.'s plurality opinion31 concluded that the at-issue
plans did not further a recognized compelling governmental interest
and were "not narrowly tailored to the goal of achieving the
educational and social benefits asserted to flow from racial
diversity ....
Instead, Roberts opined, the plans were "directed
only to racial balance, pure and simple, an objective this Court has
repeatedly condemned as illegitimate."33 In a concurring opinion
providing the fifth and majority-creating vote for striking down the
plans, Justice Anthony M. Kennedy agreed with the plurality that the
plans were not sufficiently narrowly tailored, but disagreed with
Roberts's conclusion that the pursuit of racial diversity is not a
compelling governmental interest. 4
The four dissenting Justices, in a lengthy opinion authored by
Justice Stephen G. Breyer,35 complained that the plurality

distorts precedent, it misapplies the relevant constitutional
principles, it announces legal rules that will obstruct efforts by
state and local governments to deal effectively with the growing
resegregation of public schools, it threatens to substitute for
present calm a disruptive round of race-related litigation, and it
undermines Brown's promise of integrated primary and
secondary education that local communities have sought to
make a reality. This cannot be justified in the name of the
Equal Protection Clause.36

30. Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 747
(2007); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
31. Roberts' opinion was joined in full by Justices Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas,
and Samuel Anthony Alito, Jr.
32. ParentsInvolved, 551 U.S. at 726.
33. Id.
34. Justice Kennedy wrote that while school districts may "continu[e] the important
work of bringing together students of different racial, ethnic, and economic backgrounds,"
public schools cannot pursue this objective by "resorting to widespread governmental
allocation of benefits and burdens on the basis of racial classifications." Id. at 798
(Kennedy, J., concurring). Concluding, further, that parts of Chief Justice Roberts'
plurality opinion "imply an all-too-unyielding insistence that race cannot be a factor when,
in my view, it may be taken into account." Id. at 787. Kennedy opined that school officials
pursuing racial diversity could constitutionally employ certain race-conscious measures,
including site selection of schools, drawing demographic-cognizant attendance zones, and
the targeted recruiting of students and faculty. See id. at 789.
35. Joined by Justices John Paul Stevens, David Hackett Souter, and Ruth Bader Ginsburg.
36. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 803-04 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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Justice Thomas joined Chief Justice Roberts's opinion and wrote
separately to address several arguments made in Justice Breyer's
dissent. At the outset, Thomas noted his view that "resegregation is
not occurring in Seattle or Louisville, 37 and argued that there is a
difference between segregation and racial imbalance. "[S]egregation
is the deliberate operation of a school system to carry out a
governmental policy to separate pupils in schools solely on the basis
of race.,

38

"Racial imbalance is the failure of a school district's

individual schools to match or approximate the demographic makeup
of the student population at large.,

39

Acknowledging that "presently

observed racial imbalance might result from past de jure segregation,"
Thomas posited that "racial imbalance can also result from any
number of innocent private decisions, including voluntary housing
choices."' Given Thomas's position that racial imbalance is not the
same as state-mandated segregation,41 he concluded that seeking to
address such imbalance via a voluntary integration plan is not a
"genuinely compelling state interest."42
Focusing on an issue he had considered in the early 1980s when
he served as the assistant secretary for civil rights in the Reagan
Administration's Department of Education,43 Thomas argued that
there is a "tenuous relationship between forced racial mixing and

Id. at 748 (Thomas, J., concurring).
38. Id. at 749 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
39. Id. (citation omitted).
37.

40. Id. (citation omitted).
41. "Racial isolation itself is not a harm; only state-enforced segregation is." Missouri
v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 122 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring); see also Mark Tushnet,
Clarence Thomas's Black Nationalism, 47 HOw. L.J. 323, 324 (2004) (for Thomas, racial
imbalance is "not in itself anything of constitutional concern.").
42. ParentsInvolved, 551 U.S. at 756 (Thomas, J., concurring).
43. See CLARENCE THOMAS, MY GRANDFATHER'S SON: A MEMOIR 137-40 (2007).
In a staff meeting, shortly after assuming the assistant secretary position, Thomas "asked
to see any studies that compared the academic performance of black students in integrated
primary and secondary schools with black students in segregated or predominantly black
schools. None was forthcoming, and when I pursued the matter, a staffer told me that
none existed." Id. at 142-43. He later read reports indicating that, in his words, black
students in integrated schools "were less likely by far to enroll in the more challenging
courses and more likely to have discipline problems .... The data also made it clear that
black males were dropping out of high school at an alarming rate, and that those who
remained rarely did well academically." Id. For Thomas, that "data spelled doom for
blacks in America ... I was overwhelmed by a feeling of hopelessness. Members of my
own race were caught in a cruel trap not of their own making... It was more than I could
take. I sat at my desk and wept." Id. at 143-44.
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44

231

He noted "the

fact of black achievement in 'racially isolated' environments" before
and after Brown and pointed to "evidence that black students
attending historically black colleges achieve better academic results

than those attending predominantly white colleges." 5

In fact,

Thomas wrote, Seattle's K-8 "African-American Academy," with "a
'nonwhite' enrollment of 99%,,,46 "reportedly produced test scores
higher across all grade levels in reading, writing and math."47 Thus,

44. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 765 (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Thomas had
previously made clear his view that "there is no reason to think that black students cannot
learn as well when surrounded by members of their own race as when they are in an
integrated environment." Jenkins, 515 U.S. at 121-22 (Thomas, J., concurring). Arguing
that "[w]e must forever put aside the notion that simply because a school district today is
black, it must be educationally inferior," id. at 138, Thomas observed that black middle
and high schools "can function as the center and symbol of black communities, and
provide examples of independent black leadership, success, and achievement." Id. at 122.
It is noteworthy that Thomas has also recognized that urban minority children "have been
forced into a system that continually fails them." Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S.
639, 676 (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring). Joining the Zelman Court's decision upholding
as constitutional an Ohio school voucher program, Thomas opined that "failing urban
public schools disproportionately affect minority children most in need of educational
opportunity.... Today... the promise of public school education has failed poor innercity blacks." Id. at 681-82. This "failure to provide education to poor urban children
perpetuates a vicious cycle of poverty, dependence, criminality, and alienation that
continues for the remainder of their lives. If society cannot end racial discrimination, at
least it can arm minorities with the education to defend themselves from some of
discrimination's effects." Id. at 683.
45. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 763 (Thomas, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
Reading this sentence in Justice Thomas's opinion brought to mind journalist Ron
Suskind's account of a meeting between Thomas and Cedric Jennings, an AfricanAmerican honor student at Frank W. Ballou Senior High, "the most troubled and violent
school in the blighted southeast corner of Washington, D.C." See RON SUSKIND, A HOPE
IN THE UNSEEN: AN AMERICAN ODYSSEY FROM THE INNER CITY TO THE Ivy LEAGUE

1 (1998, revised and updated 2005). Asked by Thomas if he knew what college he would
be attending, Jennings responded, "You bet. I'm off to Brown University." Id. at 120.
Thomas replied, "Well, that's fine, but I'm not sure if I would have selected an Ivy League
school.... You're going to be up there with lots of very smart white kids, and, if you're
not sure about who you are, you could get eaten alive." Id. According to Suskind's book,
Thomas also told Jennings to avoid "classes and orientation on race relations" and to say
to himself "I'm not a black person, I'm just a person." Id. at 121. Learning that Jennings
planned to major in math, Thomas expressed his approval. "That's what I look for in
hiring my clerks-the cream of the crop. I look for the maths and the sciences, real
classes, none of that Afro-American studies stuff. If they've taken that stuff as an
undergraduate, I don't want them. You want to do that, do it in your spare time." Id.
Jennings attended and graduated from Brown, and earned graduate degrees from Harvard
as well as the University of Michigan. See id. at 377, 383.
46. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 764 (Thomas, J. concurring).
47. Id. (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). Justice Thomas is
certainly correct that educational achievements by African Americans and other
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he concluded, "the children in Seattle's African American Academy

have shown gains
environment." 8

when

placed

in

a

'highly

segregated'

Additionally, Justice Thomas was not convinced by social science

research supporting the proposition that "state-compelled racial
mixing teaches children to accept cooperation and improves racial
attitudes and race relations."49 "There is no guarantee.., that
students of different races in the same school will actually spend time

with one another."5 ° He opined that students in racially integrated
schools may find themselves in racially homogenous classes as the

result of academic ability groupings, and that "students of different
races within the same school may separate themselves socially."5 For
Thomas, it is not clear that increased contact between students of
different races improves racial understandings and relations. "Some
in racial attitudes seems
studies have even found that a deterioration
52
to result from racial mixing in schools.
In the last part of his opinion, Justice Thomas argued for the
colorblind constitutionalism of Justice John Marshall Harlan
articulated in Harlan's 1896 dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson5 3 and,
according to Thomas, adopted by the plaintiff's lawyers in Brown.
"My view of the Constitution is Justice Harlan's view in Plessy: 'Our

Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes
among citizens.' And my view was the rallying cry for the lawyers
who litigated Brown. 5 4 Having invoked and aligned himself with
minorities can and do occur in the absence of white students. See, e.g., Lisa Falkenberg,
Let's Thank DeBakey for School, Too, HoUs. CHRON., July 15, 2008, at B1 (noting the
success of the DeBakey High School for Health Professions in Houston, Texas: the
magnet school is ninety percent black, Latino/a, and Asian and one-half of its students
receive free or reduced lunches; ninety-eight percent of its graduates go to college and the
school is ranked in the top 100 high schools in the United States by U.S. NEWS AND
WORLD REPORT).

48.
49.
50.
51.

Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 764 (Thomas, J. concurring).
Id. at 768.
Id.
Id. at 769; see BEVERLY DANIEL TATUM, 'WHY ARE ALL THE

SITTING TOGETHER IN THE CAFETERIA?': A PSYCHOLOGIST
DEVELOPMENT OF RACIAL IDENTITY (rev. ed., 2003) (explaining why

BLACK KIDS
EXPLAINS THE

and how students
of the same race appear to assemble in separate groups in racially integrated settings).
52. ParentsInvolved, 551 U.S. at 770 (Thomas, J., concurring).
53. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (holding that Louisiana statute mandating
separate but equal railway accommodations for black and white passengers did not violate
the Equal Protection Clause).
54. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 772 (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Harlan, the
sole dissenter in Plessy, wrote that "[ejvery one knows that the statute in question had its
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Harlan, Thurgood Marshall, and the lawyers who fought to inter the
noxious separate-but-equal doctrine in Brown, Thomas provocatively
linked Justice Breyer's Parents Involvement dissent to the
segregationists who opposed Brown. Breyer's views "first appeared
in Plessy," Thomas argued, wherein the "Court likewise paid heed to
societal practices, local expectations, and practical consequences by
looking to 'the established usages, customs and traditions of the
people, and with a view to the promotion of their comfort, and the
preservation of the public peace and good order."' 55
What was wrong in 1954 cannot be right today. Whatever else
the Court's rejection of the segregationist arguments in Brown
might have established, it certainly made clear that state and
local governments cannot take from the Constitution a right to
make decisions on the basis of race by adverse possession. The
fact that state and local governments had been discriminating
on the basis of race for a long time was irrelevant to the Brown
Court.... And the fact that the state and local governments
had relied on statements in this Court's opinions was irrelevant
to the Brown Court. The same principles guide today's
decision. None of the considerations trumpeted by the dissent
is relevant to the constitutionality of the school board's raceorigin in the purpose, not so much to exclude white persons from railroad cars occupied by
blacks, as to exclude colored people from coaches occupied by or assigned to white
persons." Plessy, 163 U.S. at 557 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Declaring that "[i]n view of the
Constitution ...[t]here is no caste here," Harlan stated:
Our Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among
citizens. In respect of civil rights, all citizens are equal before the law. The
humblest is the peer of the most powerful. The law regards man as man, and
takes no account of his surroundings or of his color when his civil rights as
guaranteed by the supreme law of the land are involved.
Id. at 559. Interestingly, and importantly, the opening sentences in the same paragraph
containing the just-quoted passage of Harlan's opinion make clear Harlan's view that the
"white race deems itself to be the dominant race in this country. And so it is, in prestige,
in achievements, in education, in wealth, and in power. So, I doubt not, it will continue to
be for all time, if it remains true to its great heritage, and holds fast to the principles of
constitutional liberty." Id. While many elide and make no reference to "Harlan's
acknowledgement of white superiority in the very paragraph in which he proclaimed fealty
to colorblindness." Ian Haney Lopez, 'A Nation of Minorities': Race, Ethnicity, and
Reactionary Colorblindness, 59 STAN. L. REV. 985, 993 (2007). Thomas has noted and
quoted this aspect of Harlan's dissent. See ParentsInvolved, 551 U.S. at 780 (Thomas, J.,
concurring). For discussions of the race-conscious views of Justice Harlan, see TINSLEY E.
YARBROUGH, JUDICIAL ENIGMA: THE FIRST JUSTICE HARLAN 160-62 (1995); Gabriel J.
Chin, The Plessy Myth: Justice Harlanand the Chinese Cases, 82 IOWA L. REV. 151 (1996);
Laurence H. Tribe, "In What Vision of the Constitution Must the Law be Color-Blind?" 20
J. MARSHALL L. REV. 201 (1986).
55. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 773 (Thomas, J.,concurring) (quoting Plessy, 163
U.S. at 550).
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based plans because no contextual detail-or collection of
contextual details-can "provide refuge from the principle that
under our Constitution, the kovernment may not make
distinctions on the basis of race."
Justice Thomas's concurrence is not an originalist opinion
seeking and discerning the original understanding and meaning of the
Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause.57 Thomas has
made clear his view that originalism58 promotes the value and cardinal
principle of judicial impartiality and is critical to the reduction of a

56. Id. at 778-79 (Thomas, J. concurring) (quoting Adarand Constructors, Inc. v.
Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 240 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring)). With regard to Justice Thomas'
statement that contextual details do not require and cannot justify departures from his nodistinction-by-race principle, consider Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499 (2005).
Dissenting from the Court's application of strict scrutiny review to a California prison
policy segregating new inmates by race, Thomas argued that "constitutional demands are
diminished in the unique context of prisons." Id. at 541 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Thus,
context can in fact matter; when and how it matters are debatable issues. See also Randall
Kennedy, Conservatives' Selective Use of Race in the Law, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
719, 720 (1996) (arguing that Justices Thomas and Scalia "need to explain their tolerance
for racial discrimination in the context of peremptory challenges but their intolerance of
affirmative action.").
57. Because he did not apply an originalist methodology, Justice Thomas did not
address and has not indicated whether he agrees or disagrees with the argument and
conclusion that the framers and ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment did not intend or
understand that the amendment would prohibit racial segregation in public schools. See
RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT

BY JUDICIARY:

THE TRANSFORMATION

OF THE

FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 16-18 (2d ed., 1997) (studying the Fourteenth Amendment
"in the service of no other cause than integrity of constitutional construction" and arguing
that "segregation was left untouched by the Fourteenth Amendment"); RICHARD A.
POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 62 (1995) ("It was unclear, to say the least, that the framers
or ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment had intended the equal protection clause to
prevent racially segregated public education."); MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE
CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS 156 (1999) ("[T]he very Congress that
submitted the Fourteenth Amendment to the states for ratification also supported
segregated schools in the District of Columbia," and the amendment's supporters assured
their opponents that the amendment would not lead to integrated schools.); Alexander
Bickel, The Original Understandingand the Segregation Decisions, 69 HARV. L. REV. 1, 64
(1955) ("[T]he immediate objectives to which section 1 of the fourteenth amendment was
addressed ... was not expected in 1866 to apply to segregation."); Michael Klarman, An
Interpretive History of Modern Equal Protection, 90 MICH. L. REV. 213, 252 (1991)
("Evidence regarding the original understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment is
ambiguous as to a wide variety of issues, but not school segregation. Virtually nothing in
the constitutional debates suggests that the Fourteenth Amendment was intended to
prohibit school segregation, while contemporaneous state practices render such an
interpretation fanciful .... "). But see Michael W. McConnell, Originalism and the
DesegregationDecisions, 81 VA. L. REV. 947 (1995) (arguing that Brown is consistent with
and can be squared with originalism).
58. See supranotes 20-26 and accompanying text.
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judge's discretionary decisionmaking. It ensures that judges decide
cases on the basis of the original understanding or meaning of
constitutional text and do not act on their politics or personal views.
Not employing and therefore not meeting his own standard of nondiscretionary judging, Thomas's Parents Involved opinion clearly sets
forth his views on the difference between segregation and racial
imbalance, and his views on the policy and utility or futility of "racial
mixing" in pursuit of improving educational outcomes for black
children and in improving the racial attitudes of all children.
As for Justice Thomas's quotation and use of Justice Harlan's
colorblind metaphor and argument that Thomas's view is the same as
the "rallying cry" of the Brown lawyers, 9 this move may have
rhetorical force and argumentative power for those, like Judge
Wilkinson, who agree with Thomas's race-neutral construction and
application of the Fourteenth Amendment. 6° Thomas's see-no-color
and government-can-make-no-racial-distinctions principles reflect his
belief
that there is a moral and constitutional equivalence.., between
laws designed to subjugate a race and those that distribute
benefits on the basis of race in order to foster some notion of
equality. Government cannot make us equal, it can61 only
recognize, respect, and protect us as equal before the law.

59. Reacting to the contention that the Brown lawyers' and plaintiffs' challenge to
"racial classifications" in the 1950s was the same as, and supported the challenge to, the
voluntary integration plans before the Parents Involved Court, Brown lawyer (and now
senior federal Judge) Robert L. Carter stated: "All race was used for at that point in time
was to deny equal opportunity to black people. It's to stand that argument on its head to
use race the way they use [it] now." Adam Liptak, The Same Words, But Differing Views,
N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 2007, at A24 (quoting Carter); see also id. (Brown lawyer Jack
Greenberg describing Chief Justice Roberts' characterization of Brown as "preposterous,"
and Brown lawyer William Coleman stating that the Court's decision "is 100 percent
wrong" and is "dirty pool.").
60. See J. Harvie Wilkinson III, Toward One America: A Vision in Law, 83 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 323, 333-34 (2008) (arguing against "public allocations and benefits ...premised on
ethnicity and race," for "neutrality as to race," and for an understanding of the Equal
Protection Clause "reflect[ing] the view that the strongest nation will be one in which each
and every human being is freed from the yoke of identification and discrimination based
on race").
61. Adarand Constructors,515 U.S. at 240 (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Stevens,
disagreeing with Thomas' equivalence reasoning, found no "moral or constitutional
equivalence between a policy that is designed to perpetuate a caste system and one that
seeks to eradicate racial subordination." Id. at 243 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Treating all
racial distinctions as equivalent "would disregard the difference between a 'No
Trespassing' sign and a welcome mat. It would treat a Dixiecrat Senator's decision to vote
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Of course, whether Thomas's views are accurate and can
persuade those who
do not subscribe to colorblind constitutionalism
62

is another matter.
Justice Thomas's beliefs and embrace of Harlan, what Thomas

likes or "simply dislikes as a policy matter, ' 63 his reading and
understanding of Brown (a nonoriginalist and "classic legislative

decision")" as applied in the context of present-day voluntary raceconscious integration plans-all of these views and positions are
important and warrant respectful and rigorous critique. But that
critique must include recognition of the fact that Thomas did not
employ the originalist methodology that he has identified as
indispensable to ascertaining the framers' and ratifiers' "fixed
meaning" of the Equal Protection Clause free from the influence and

decisional distortion of a jurist's personal and policy preferences.

Is

not his Parents Involved opinion an exemplar of the very "product of

the person" 66 and judge-as-legislator adjudication decried by Thomas?
III. Judge Wilkinson's Praise of Justice Thomas
In praising Justice Thomas's Parents Involved concurrence,
Judge Wilkinson remarks that
[n]o one has been more eloquent than Justice Thomas in
pointing out the heavy price in human pride and dignity that
black Americans have been asked to pay-a case that the
Carmichaels and Browns and Cleavers of the late 1960s tried

against Thurgood Marshall's confirmation in order to keep African-Americans off the
Supreme Court as on par with President Johnson's evaluation of his nominee's race as a
positive factor. It would equate a law that made black citizens ineligible for military
service with a program aimed at recruiting black soldiers." Id. at 245.
62. We do know that Justice Thurgood Marshall rejected the colorblind approach
championed by Justice Thomas. As Marshall wrote in his separate opinion in Regents of
the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 401 (1978), "[i]t
is because of the
legacy of unequal treatment that we must now permit the institutions of this society to give
consideration to race in making decisions about who will hold the positions of influence,
affluence and prestige in America .... If we are ever to become a fully integrated society,"
Marshall continued, "one in which the color of a person's skin will not determine the
opportunities available to him or her, we must be willing to take steps to open those doors.
I do not believe that anyone can truly look into America's past and still find that a remedy
for the effects of that past is impermissible." Id. at 401-02.
63. Ryan, supra note 28, at 151.
64. POSNER, supra note 57, at 281.
65. See supra note 20, and accompanying text.
66. See Thomas, supra note 12, at 3.

Winter 2009]

PROBLEMATIC PRAISE OF JUSTICE CLARENCE THOMAS

237

radically and unsuccessfully to make outside the councils of
influence and power.67
Thomas "has shattered stereotypes of how African Americans were
expected to behave and think, and he has done this with an
unquenchable faith in the ability of African Americans to draw upon
their personal resources, not only for themselves, but to make our
country a better place to be."68 Wilkinson concludes that Thomas's
opinion "should give the final boot to any notion that the Justice is an
outlier. In his insistent plea for true nondiscrimination, he has spoken
from the depths of the American and African-American experience
and made a priceless contribution to the debate on race and
education in this country." 69
If Judge Wilkinson is correct that the Thomas concurrence is a
noteworthy expression of the "intensely personal statements" of "the
Court's sole African-American Justice,"7 ° then Thomas's opinion is
not the judicial work product of an originalist, deracinated, impartial,
emotionless, and dispassionate Thomasian model jurist." Instead, it is
the pronouncement of, not just a judge, but a racialized and black
jurist and a conservative critical race theorist. 2 Thomas's racial and

67. Wilkinson, supra note 1, at 169.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 164.
71. See supra note 15, and accompanying text.
72. See Guy-Uriel E. Charles, Colored Speech: Cross Burnings, Epistemics, and the
Triumph of the Crits?, 93 GEo. L.J. 575, 626 (2005). Professor Charles' article discusses
Justice Thomas' approach to the First Amendment in Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343
(2003), wherein the Court held that a Virginia statute prohibiting cross burning with an
intent to intimidate did not violate the First Amendment. Thomas "analyzed the harm
caused by cross burning from his perspective as a person of color" and "brought sensitivity
to the issue that he had acquired on the basis of his experiences as an African American."
Charles, supra note 72, at 608. Thomas' dissenting opinion noted that in "every culture,
certain things acquire meaning well beyond what outsiders can comprehend." Virginia,
538 U.S. at 388 (Thomas, J., dissenting). This "reference to 'outsiders' is interesting in
that the only African-American member of the Court appears to position himself as an
outsider who is privy to something that insiders (including, in this case, the other justices)
may not comprehend and fully appreciate-the real impact and harms of cross burnings."
Ronald Turner, Cross Burnings and the Harm-ValuationAnalytic: A Tale of Two Cases, 9
BERKELEY J. AFR.-AM. L. & POL'Y 3, 29 (2007). Not only did Thomas not push aside his
racial background as he said a jurist must do when deciding cases (see supra note 15 and
accompanying text); his analysis, reasoning, and opinion, grounded in his understanding of
the African-American experience, influenced the Court's rejection of the challenge to
Virginia's anti-cross-burning law. See Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Using the Master's "Tool"
to Dismantle His House: Why Justice Clarence Thomas Makes the Case for Affirmative
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social background are thus critical to Wilkinson's analysis and praise
74
73
of the "passion and eloquence, of Thomas, "'a man, a black man'
whose "long and rather lonely quest for a rightful place for black
Americans makes him a worthy successor to the Blacks, Wrights, and
Wisdoms from whose region he hails."75
This is problematic praise. If Judge Wilkinson is right, Justice
Thomas's concurrence is an instance of ideological judging, with
ideology understood as "a body of more or less coherent bedrock
beliefs about social, economic, and political questions, or, more
precisely perhaps, a worldview that shapes one's answers to those
questions., 76 The sources of a judge's ideology include his or her
"upbringing, education, salient life experiences, and personal
characteristics (which may determine those experiences) such as race,
sex, and ethnicity...., 7 Thus, to laud Thomas for authoring an
opinion grounded in and reflecting his race, racialized experience,
and worldview is to applaud him for the commission of a judicial act
lacking the "impartiality [which] is the very essence of judging and of
being a judge., 78 Ironically, Thomas is praised "for engaging in and
committing the very act of judicial partiality the Justice [has]
denounced ....
Judge Wilkinson also highlights the "Let him alone!" exhortation
found in Thomas's quotation of the abolitionist Frederick Douglass in

Action, 47 ARIz. L. REV. 113, 145-48 (2005); see also Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Just
Another Brother on the SCT?: What Justice Thomas Teaches Us About the Influence of
Racial Identity, 90 IOWA L. REV. 931, 1002 (2005) ("Regardless of how one describes
Justice Thomas' jurisprudence, it is clear that he is deeply influenced by his life
experiences when deciding cases that directly implicate race.").
73. Wilkinson, supra note 1, at 164.
74. Id. at 166 (quoting Justice Thomas).
75. Id. at 167 (referring to Justice Hugo Black of Alabama, Fifth Circuit Judge John
Minor Wisdom, and Louisiana federal court Judge J. Skelly Wright).
76. Richard A. Posner, The Role of the Judge in the Twenty-First Century, 86 B.U. L.
REV. 1049, 1059 (2006).
77. Id. at 1060; see also AHARON BARAK, PURPOSIVE INTERPRETATION IN LAW 212
(2005) ("A judge's interpretation is the product of his or her personality and life
experience; the product of the balance he or she strikes between certainty and
experimentation, security and change, reason and emotion."); JEFFREY A. SEGAL &
HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED

86 (2002) (The attitudinal model "holds that the Supreme Court decides disputes in light
of the facts of the case vis-A-vis the ideological attitudes and values of the justices.").
78. Thomas, supra note 12, at 4.
79. Ronald Turner, Grutter and the Passion of Justice Thomas: A Response to
ProfessorKearney, 13 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 821,824 (2005).

Winter 2009]

PROBLEMATIC PRAISE OF JUSTICE CLARENCE THOMAS

239

Grutter v. Bollinger.' Arguing that this quotation is the "crux of the
Thomas philosophy,""' Wilkinson states:
State-enforced segregation was manipulative by nature-a
wholesale repudiation of the Douglass plea. But so too was
racial balancing, even the benign variety, the sort of
interference that Douglass would never countenance. Thus the
repeated suspicion in [Thomas's] ParentsInvolved concurrence
of federal judges as "social engineers" and of "elites bearing
would have been
racial theories." Even those best of intentions
82
anathema to Douglass-Let him alone!
Consideration and evaluation of this invocation of Douglass must
take into account the fact that Justice Thomas's quotation of
Douglass in Grutter omitted key passages of Douglass's 1865 speech.
What follows is the full quotation of the part of the Douglass address
Justice Thomas quoted in Grutter, with the ellipsed and elided
passages omitted by the Justice set out in italics:
I think the American people are disposed often to be
generous rather than just. I look over this country at the present
time, and I see Educational Societies, Sanitary Commissions,
Freedmen's Association, and the like,-all very good; but in
regard to the colored people, there is always more that is
benevolent, I perceive, than just, manifested toward us. What I
ask for the negro is not benevolence, not pity, not sympathy,
but simply justice. The American people have always been
anxious to know what they shall do with us. Gen. Banks was
distressed with solicitude as to what he should do with the negro.
Everybody has asked the question, and they learned to ask it
early of the abolitionists:"What shall we do with the negro?" I
have had but one answer from the beginning. Do nothing with
us! Your doing with us has already played the mischief with us.
80. See Wilkinson, supra note 1, at 165 (quoting Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306,
349-50 (2003)) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Frederick
Douglass, What the Black Man Wants: An Address Delivered in Boston, Massachusetts, on
26 January1865, in 4 THE FREDERICK DOUGLASS PAPERS 59, 68 (John W. Blasingame &

John R. McKivigan eds., 1991)); see also Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 676
(2002) (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting Frederick Douglass' statement that "[e]ducation...
means emancipation. It means light and liberty. It means the uplifting of the soul of man
into the glorious light of truth, the light by which men can only be made free."); id. at 684
(quoting Douglass' statement that "no greater benefit can be bestowed upon a long
benighted people, than giving to them, as we are here earnestly this day endeavoring to
do, the means of an education").
81. Wilkinson, supra note 1, at 165.
82. Id.
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Do nothing with us! If the apples will not remain on the tree of
their own strength, if they are worm-eaten at the core, if they
are early ripe and disposed to fall, let them fall! I am not for
tying or fastening them on the tree in any way, except by nature's
plan, and if they will not stay there let them fall. And if the
negro cannot stand on his own legs, let him fall also. All I ask
is, give him a chance to stand on his own legs! Let him alone!
If you see him on his way to school, let him alone,-don't disturb
him! If you see him going to the dinner table at a hotel, let him
go! If you see him going to the ballot box, let him alone!-don't
disturb him! If you see him going into a workshop, just let him
13
alone,-your interference is doing him positive injury ....
As noted by Professor Charles Ogletree, Justice Thomas's partial
quotation of Douglass gives the appearance "of the plea of a man at
one with Justice Thomas in his distrust of remedial schemes.
Douglass, however, was no foe [of] social redistribution. On the
contrary, he was an avid proponent of the need for reconstruction
after the Civil War."
Douglass clearly states that the work of
educational societies, sanitary commissions, and the Freedmen's
Association were "all very good,, 85 a view consistent with his
approval of the "religious, secular, and quasi-governmental agencies
created during the Civil War to meet the spiritual, intellectual, and
medical needs of both freedmen and Union soldiers. 8 6 (Indeed,
"[t]here was no job, short of president or pope, that... Douglass
would have liked better" than heading the Freedmen's Bureau.).'
Douglass's "Let him alone!" plea was not a declaration of
opposition to race-conscious efforts to address the needs of African
Americans.
The declaration "Let him alone!" was in direct
opposition to General Nathaniel Banks' campaign to implement a
color-coded serfdom and force freed slaves to return to and work on
plantations. 8s "Let him alone!" reprimanded those who obstructed
and accosted black persons as they tried to go to school, or dine at a
hotel, or vote, or work. In that bill of particulars, Douglass left no

83. Douglass, What the Black Man Wants, supra note 80, at 67-68. Note that in the
quoted material the word "justice" was italicized.
84. Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., From Brown to Tulsa: Defining Our Own Future, 47
How. L.J. 499, 548 (2004).
85. Douglass, supra note 80, at 68.
86. Id. at 68 n.12 (editors' note).
87.
88.

WILLIAM S. MCFEELEY, FREDERICK DOUGLASS 260 (1991).
See JOHN STAUFFER, THE BLACK HEARTS OF MEN: RADICAL ABOLITIONISTS

AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF RACE 277 (2002).
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doubt as to whom he was addressing and what he meant when he
stated that "interference is doing him positive injury."89 Thus, the
argument that Douglass indisputably opposed certain governmental
actions focusing on and promoting the interests, aspirations, and
rights of African Americans, based as it is on the selective quotation
of the 1865 speech,' is simply incorrect.
Whether Douglass would agree today with the views attributed
to him by Justice Thomas and Judge Wilkinson is a speculative and
ultimately unhelpful inquiry since "[t]he cruel legacy of 250 years of
slavery in America has proved more stubborn than even ... Douglass,
a former slave and consummate realist, imagined."9' Indeed, in an
1875 speech an openly race-conscious and color-aware Douglass said
the following:
It is said by some: "We have done enough for the negro." Yes,
you have done a great deal for the negro, and, for one, I am
deeply sensible of it, and grateful for it. But after all, what have
you done? We were slaves-and you have made us free-and
given us the ballot. But the world has never seen any people
turned loose to such destitution as were the four million slaves
of the South.... They were free! [FIree to hunger; free to the
winds and rains of heaven; free to the pitiless wrath of enraged
masters, who, since they could no longer control them, were
willing to let them starve. They were free, without roofs to
cover them, or bread to eat, or land to cultivate, and as a
consequence died in such numbers as to awaken the hope of
their enemies that they would soon disappear. We gave them
freedom and famine at the same time. The marvel is that they
still live. What the negro wants is, first, protection of the rights
already conceded by law, and, secondly, education. Talk of
having done enough for these people after two hundred years of
enforced ignoranceand stripes is absurd,cruel,and heartless.92

89. Douglass, supra note 80, at 68.
90. See MERIDA & FLETCHER, supra note 8, at 278 (noting that Thomas was selective
in quoting Douglass and "omitted key lines from Douglass's 1865 speech ... the omitted
text was the advocacy part of the speech in which Douglass challenged the nation to stop
crushing the rights of blacks").
91.

Peter H. Schuck, Affirmative Action: Past, Present, and Future, 20 YALE L. &

POL'Y REV. 1, 4 (2002).
92. Frederick Douglass, Celebrating the Past, Anticipating the Future: An Address
Delivered in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, on 14 April 1875, in 4 THE FREDERICK

DOUGLASS PAPERS, supra note 80, at 412-13 (emphasis added).
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"What have you done" and the "absurd, cruel, and heartless"
"[t]alk of having done enough" 93 calls into question, indeed belies, the
claim that "Let him alone!" was the guiding tenet for Douglass.
Accordingly, Douglass should not and must not be placed in the ranks
of the race neutralists. Iconography has its limits.
CONCLUSION
Judge Wilkinson praises the intensely personal statements made
by Justice Thomas in his ParentsInvolved concurrence and applauds
Thomas for speaking from the American and African-American
Wilkinson thus lauds Thomas's approach to and
experience.
construction of the Equal Protection Clause, even though that which
Wilkinson praises is antithetical to Thomas's call for impersonal,
impartial, and deracinated judging. And Wilkinson's unquestioning
embrace of Thomas's invocation of the abolitionist Frederick
Douglass further illustrates the perils and problematics of such praise.
While aligning oneself with an iconic figure can be useful in
persuading others of the correctness of a contested proposition, the
rhetorical power of iconography should never be allowed to serve as
an analytic substitute for rigorous and informed critique.

93. Id. at 413.

